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1 Introduction
A vast class of models of choice assume deterministic behaviour. This holds both for the
classical rationalmodel (e.g. Samuelson [22], Richter [17]) and for more recent models
of boundedly rational choice. But empirical economists have always had to confront the
noisiness of the data. This raises the need to graft an appropriate error structure on the
model, and therefore leads to the construction of a probabilistic choice model. Pioneering
theoretical contributions in this area have been Luce [7] and Block and Marshaks [2] and
Marshaks [15] Random Utility Maximization (RUM) model. In this paper we present a
simple model of probabilistic choice from discrete choice sets (including RUM as a special
case), with two main features:
1) The stochastic components of the model is given a precise interpretation.
2) Some parameters governing those components are endogenised via an equilibrium
process.
The RUM model culminated in its most inuential version, McFaddens ([10], [11])
conditional logit (or multinomial logit) discrete choice model, in which the probability
p(ai; A) that alternative ai is selected from a choice set A takes the form
p(ai; A) = exp (u (ai)) =
X
aj2A
exp (u (aj)) ,
where u (aj) expresses the systematic utilityof alternative aj.1 This model is a case
within a general class in which alternative ai generates a random utility stimulusu (ai)+
"i, where "i is an error term, and is chosen over alternative aj if u (ai) u (aj) > "j "i. In
this perspective, the crucial step consists of dening an appropriate probabilistic structure
on the errors. The logit model follows from the "i taking on i.i.d. Gumbel (or extreme
value type I) distributions2. A probit model would follow instead by assuming normal
distributions. In general, the basic constraint is that larger errors are made with smaller
1In applications, it is usually assumed further that utility is a linear function of the alternative at-
tributes.
2Gumbel distribution function (with parameters  and ): F (x) = exp

 e x 

.
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probabilities, from which it follows that better alternatives are chosen with higher prob-
ability. Closely related ideas have also found their way in modelling strategic behaviour,
for the rst time with McKelvey and Palfreys ([13], [14]) notion of Quantal Response
Equilibrium (QRE)3.
This approach has proved to be extremely useful for experimental and empirical eco-
nomics. But it seems fair to say that - beside the basic constraint of error monotonicity
in utility - the error structure is not given a clear psychological foundation. Rather, it is
chosen for analytical convenience from a standard set of statistical distributions, and then
is added on to a determinsitic model. In other words, economic (or psychological) theory
stops at the level of utility maximisation. Bounded rationalityfollows from exogeneous
random errors. This makes the error structure rather di¢ cult to assess and interpret.4
We propose here a di¤erent route: we formulate directly a boundedly rational model
of choice wihich includes some stochastic components. The main advantage of doing so
is that the error structure becomes fully transparent, being part of the core model itself.
The stochastic components of this model are extremely simple and, especially, can be
given a precise psychological interpretation.
The model focusses on the notion of a consideration set. The agent does not rationally
evaluate all objectively available alternatives, but only a (possibly strict) subset of them,
the consideration set. Once a consideration set has been formed, a choice is made by
means of a preference relation, which in this paper we assume to be standard (complete
and transitive). This two-step conceptualisation of the act of choice is rooted in psychology
3See Goeree, Holt and Palfrey [4] for an overview.
4In his Nobel lecture, McFadden [12] recounts of how he rst developed the model in response to
a specic practical problem, and then sought a theoretical foundation, which he found in the Gumbel
error specication within RUM theory. We recall here that the Gumbel distribution function can be seen
as the limit distribution function of (a suitable transformation of) the maximum value statistics for a
sample of N i.i.d. random variables, as N tends to innity. The statistics needs to be appropriately
transformed when taking the limit since, obviously, letting G:be the common distribution function of the
random variables and GM the distribution function of max (Xi)i=1;:::;N , we have limN!1
 
GM (x)

=
limN!1 (G (x))
N
= 0 for any x unless G (x) = 1. Even this brief account of the error structure behind
the conditional logit model makes it transparent how opaque its economic or psychological interpretation
is.
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and marketing science, but it has begun to di¤use in economics. Several recent models
of boundedly rational choice adopt it in one way or the other (Manzini and Mariotti [8],
Eliaz and Spiegler [3], Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [9])5.
In our model the formation of the consideration set is stochastic. It is in fact the only
stochastic component of the model. For an alternative, the probability of membership
of the consideration set depends on two types of parameters (probabilities). The rst
parameter  (rationality), expresses the general propensity of the agent to consider all
alternatives. The second parameter i (salience) is alternative specic. We present two
natural models (called AND and OR) that depend on the specic way the parameters
combine to determine the probability of membership of the consideration set.
We show that for a special case (that of equal salience across alternatives) both models
can be expressed in a logit format. However, we use only ordinal preference information.
Contrast this with the logit model which uses, as explained above, equations of the type
u (ai)  u (aj) > "j   "i. These equations are only invariant to common cardinal (a¢ ne)
transformations of the u and the errors, andf therefore contain cardinal information.
One advantage of expressing rationality in parametric form is that makes it easy to
study how the probability of a given alternative being chosen varies with rationality.
We nd that some of the intuitiveproperties of error do not hold. One might expect,
for example, that as rationality increases the agent will tend to choose each nonoptimal
alternative with lower and lower probability: but we show that this is not necessarily
the case. Both the AND and the OR models predict either monotonic or single peaked
relationships between  and the probability of choice, for all alternatives. The ANDmodel
predicts, for all alternatives and all parameters, an interval (and possibly the full interval)
in which the probability of choice increases with rationality. The OR model predicts an
increasing interval for some alternatives and some parameter congurations, but forbids
increasingness on the whole range except for the best alternative. Unexpected e¤ects
may also occur (in the OR model) in respect of the odds (probability ratio) of choosing
a better alternative over a worse alternative, which may decrease with . And in both
5These three models are examples of the modern sophisticated models of choice behavior which are
deterministicwe alluded to in the opening.
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models the odds fail Luces [7] Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives test (which implies,
together with other assumptions, the logit model)6. Salience enters these relationships in
a non-obvious way.
In the second part of the paper we endogenise salience. We consider situations in
which alternatives can inuence their own salience. There are many examples that t this
case. In electoral contests, politicians make statements to get noticed by the voters, not
only to persuade them. Voters may not consider certain parties for cultural reasons or
out of habit7 (see Wilson [24] for a consideration set approach to political competition).
In animal mate competition the alternatives are male animals, the chooser is a female,
and salience is controlled via natural selection (e.g. endowing peacocks with more or less
showy tails), or by human activities (hair-styling, body-building, wealth-accumulation).
In an I.O. context the alternatives are products, and salience is controlled via marketing
strategies (Eliaz and Spieglers [3] work mentioned before is the rst to study in detail
this type of competitive situation).8
Our main result is that, when alternatives can fully control their own salience (ab-
solute salience), in equilibrium - under very general assumptions - both models have a
the showiest is the bestfeature: the equilibrium ordering of salience fully reects the
preference ordering over alternatives.
However, when salience is relative (so that alternatives can control salience only par-
tially), there exists fully perverse equilibria in both models. In such equilibria the worst
alternative has the highest probability of being chosen.
All these results have a bearing for the inferences we draw on true preferences us-
ing revealed preferences reconstructed from choice data. We briey comment on such
6In its core version. The nested logit, for example, allow for violations of IIA. A probit model also
allows for such violations. See e.g. Agresti [1] for an overview of statistical methods for categorical data.
7In Wilson [24], for example, it is reported that African Americans tend to ignore Republican candi-
dates in spite of the overlap betwen their policy preferences and the stance of the Republicans, and even
if they are dissatised with the Democratic candidate.
8Examples in our discipline of factors a¤ecting salience might be the choice of research topic, or the
title of a paper (an author wants to be read, reader has only a limited attention, catchy titles confer
salience - we may imagine that choosing here means remembering: the reader only puts e¤ort in
remembering the best quality paper among those he has considered).
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implications in the concluding section.
2 Salience and rationality
2.1 The Model
There is a countable (possibly nite) choice set of alternatives A = fa1; :::; an; :::g. The
agent has a strict preference ordering  on A. We will often refer to the position of an
alternative in the ranking as its quality, with a lower i indicating a higher quality, so that
ai  aj i¤ i < j.
While a standard rational consumer explores the entire choice set A and picks the
maximal element according to , here  is applied only to a consideration set C (A)  A
of alternatives (the set of alternatives he actively considers). We allow for the consider-
ation set to be empty, in which case the chooser picks a default option a (e.g. walking
away from the shop, remaining without a partner, abstaining from voting).
Membership of C (A) for the alternatives in A is probabilistic. The probability of
membership combines two components (probabilities): an idiosyncratic component i 2
[0; 1] which is specic to the alternative and an alternative-independent component  2
(0; 1). We call the probability i the salience of alternative ai, and a list (1; :::; n; :::) a
salience prole. Note that while we use the term salience throughout for simplicity and
because it tallies with leading examples, there are situations in which i is not associated
with awareness of the alternative by the agent, but rather with the resistance of the agent
to consider the alternative for choice (e.g. for ideological reasons).
The probability  measures the general propensity of the agent to consider all alter-
natives. All else being equal, an agent with a higher  is more likely, coeteris paribus,
to apply his preference to the entire choice set A and  can thus be interpreted as the
agents degree of rationality.
We consider two elementary probability models, both of which determine C (A) in two
stages, as depicted in gure 1. The sets at the terminal nodes indicate the destination of
the alternative.
ORmodel: any alternative ai is drawn into the consideration set with probability i, and
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OR model AND model
C(A) A\C(A)
A\C(A) A\C(A)C(A)C(A)
_ 1-_ _ 1-_
a 1-a a 1-a
Figure 1: Structure of the two models
then all alternatives which havent been drawn in this way are considered with probability
. So
prob (ai 2 C (A)) = i + (1  i) 
AND model: any alternative ai is provisionally drawn into the consideration set with
probability i, and it remains there with probability . So
prob (ai 2 C (A)) = i
In both models, once the probabilistic consideration phase has been completed and a
set C (A) has been formed, the agent chooses (if C (A) is nonempty) the alternative ai
with the properties that
ai 2 C (A) and ai  aj for all aj 2 C (A) n faig
If C (A) is empty he chooses the default option a.9
Finally, observe that the models are invariant to permuting the order in which salience
and rationality are applied.
2.2 The Logit Retrouvé?
There is a formal relation between these models and the RUM models. We begin by
discussing a benchmark situation, in which both models collapse to a logit form. Let
9The default option could be replaced by a more complex procedure to arrive at a choice, notably
uniform randomisation over A.
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pAND (ai; A) and pOR (ai; A) denote the probabilities of choice conditional on the agent
picking an element in A in the AND and in the OR model, respectively.
Proposition 1 There exists a utility function u : A! Re representing  on A, a salience
prole, and coe¢ cients ; 0; ; 0 such that pAND (ai; A) and pOR (ai; A) can be written
in logit form, that is
pOR (ai; A) = exp ( + u (ai)) =
X
j
exp ( + u (aj))
pAND (ai; A) = exp (
0 + 0u (ai)) =
X
j
exp (0 + 0u (aj)) ,
To see this, lets write down the choice probabilities explicitly. In the OR model, the
probability pOR (ai) that ai 2 A is chosen is10:
pOR (ai) = i
Y
j<i
((1  j) (1  ))| {z }+ (1  i) 
Y
j<i
((1  j) (1  ))| {z }
probability that ai enters C in the
rst stage and the alternatives better
than ai do not enter C
probability that ai enters C in the
second stage and the alternatives better
than ai do not enter C
that is
pOR (ai) = (i + (1  i) ) (1  )i 1
Y
j<i
(1  j)
In the AND model, the probability pAND (ai) that ai 2 A is chosen is
pAND (ai) = i
Y
j<i
(1  j)| {z } 
Y
j<i
(1  j)| {z }
probability that ai enters C (A) in the
rst stage and the alternatives better
than ai do not enter C (A)
probability that ai remains in C (A) in
the second stage and the alternatives
better than ai do not enter C (A)
that is,
pAND (ai) = i
Y
j<i
(1  j)
10Use the convention that
Q0
j=1(:) = 1.
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Consider now the case of a common level of salience  2 (0; 1), with  = i for all i. Then
the probability distributions are log-linear in quality
log pOR (ai) =    (i  1)
log pAND (ai) = 
0   0 (i  1) ,
with  = log ( +   ),  =   log (1  ) (1  ), 0 = log , and 0 =   log (1  ).
It follows that, dening an (ordinal) utility function u representing on A by u (ai) = 1 i
we can write the probabilities of choice conditional on the agent picking an element in A
as in the statement of Proposition 1.
This observation provides a simple new psychological foundation for an often used
error specication. The OR and AND models can be seen in this perspective a class of
distortionsof the conditional logit model, where the distortions arise from di¤erences in
salience between the alternatives. For example in the OR model
log pOR (ai) = log (i + (1  i) ) + (i  1) log (1  ) +
X
j<i
log (1  j)
and i may enter non-linearly in the expression through the term
P
j<i log (1  j).
It is important, however, to bear in mind that the logit structure only holds for (a¢ ne
transformations of) the particular utility specication assumed. As our models use ordinal
preference information as primitive, the probability of choice can only be invariant to
that type of information. Some allowed utility transformations will destroy the loglinear
relationships. In other words, at a fundamental level the log-linearity only holds with
respect to the quality ranking index.
2.3 Limiting behavior
The limiting behavior of the two models underscores notable di¤erences. In the limit as 
tends to 1, for any salience prole, the OR model clearly converges to the standard model
of preference maximisation: the best alternative is considered with probability one, and
therefore it is chosen with probability one. On the contrary, in the AND model there
may still be a positive probability (depending on the salience prole) that the better
alternatives are not considered, and therefore are not chosen.
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Curiously, the limiting version of the AND model for high rationality coincides with
the limiting version of the OR model for low rationality,
lim
!1
pAND (a) = lim
!0
pOR (a) = i
Y
j<i
(1  j)
A moments reection explains this with the fact that taking these opposit limits is
the way to make consideration behavior be determined solely by salience in each of two
models. Observe that the quality di¤erence e¤ect persists in the limit.
The limiting conditional probabilities of choice as  vanishes are of interest:
lim
!0
pOR (ai; A) = lim
!0
(i + (1  i) ) (1  )i 1
Q
j<i (1  j)X
k
(k + (1  k) ) (1  )k 1
Q
j<k (1  j)
=
i
1 + k
X
k<i
k
Q
j<k
1
(1 j) +
X
k>i
k
Q
j<k (1  j)
and
lim
!0
pAND (ai; A) = lim
!0
i
Q
j<i (1  j)X
k
k
Q
j<k (1  j)
=
iX
k
k
These calculations highlight a further di¤erence from the logit (or quantal) models,
which collapse to random choice as when the rationalityparameter  of the logit tends to
0. In general the limiting behaviour for  that tends to 0 is not purely random choice in our
models. In both the OR and the ANDmodel the salience di¤erence between alternatives is
preserved in the limit. In addition the quality di¤erence between alternatives is preserved
in the limit in the OR model (though not in the AND model).
The ANDmodel obviously does collapse to random choice in the limit of low rationality
in the common salience case (assume here the number of alternatives to be a nite number
10
n).11 The OR model collapses instead to random choice in the limit of low rationality
provided that common salience also vanishes:
i =  2 (0; 1) for all i)
lim
!0
lim
!0
pOR (ai; A) =
1
n
Note that the order matters in the above repeated limit.
2.4 Basic Comparative Statics Properties
Some comparative statics properties are immediate and, in both the OR and AND model,
as expected:
 (salience responsiveness) the probability of an alternative being chosen increases
in the alternatives own salience and decreases in the salience of the other alterna-
tives;
 (quality responsiveness) an increase in own quality12 increases the probability of
the alternative being chosen;
 (monotonicity) if the salience ranking is (weakly) the same as the inverse quality
ranking (i.e. i < j ) i  j), the probability that a better alternative is chosen is
higher than the probability that a worse alternative is chosen.13 However, the dis-
tribution of salience may scramble this association between quality and probability
of being chosen.
11Though not the OR model: in the common salience case we have
lim
!0
pOR (ai; A)
=

2  
 
1 
X
k<i
1
(1 )i k
!
  (1  )n i
12More precisely, a permutation of the objects in the preference order which improves the ranking of
the object.
13So in particular this holds for the case of equal salience i =  for some common  2 [0; 1].
11
Because pOR (ai) and pAND (ai) are ith degree polynomials in , the e¤ect of an increase
in rationality is more subtle. In this respect the status of the best alternative a1 is di¤erent
from that of all the other alternatives. For a1 an increase in rationality is always good
news in both models, with
@pAND (a1)
@
= (1  1) > 0
@pOR (a1)
@
= 1 > 0
(observe however that the two models have opposite implications concerning the e¤ect of
salience on the impact of rationality).
A further observation stems from looking at the distribution functions, over quality
levels, indicating the probability of choosing an alternative of at least a given level i of
quality:
FOR (i) = 1  (1  )i
Y
ji
(1  j)
FAND (i) = 1 
Y
ji
(1  j)
from which it is evident that, in both models:
 (cumulative rationality responsiveness) For any quality level i, the probabil-
ity of choosing an alternative of quality i or better is increasing in the degree of
rationality.
But for individual alternatives di¤erent from the best, the probability of being chosen
as a function of rationality depends in a non-obvious way on the parameters of the model.
3 Who gains from rationality?
3.1 OR model
In this section we discuss how the probability of choice for an alternative can vary non-
monotonically (but with at most one peak) in the OR model as rationality increases.
Compute
12
@pOR (ai)
@
=
"
(1  i) (1  )i 1
Y
j<i
(1  j)
#
+"
(i + (1  i) ) (i  1) (1  )i 2
Y
j<i
(1  j)
#
= (1  )i 2 (1  ii   i (1  i) )
Y
j<i
(1  j)
which is ambiguous in sign. The decomposition highlights the source of ambiguity. On
the one hand, an increase in  increases the probability that ai will be considered by
the decision maker in the event, with probability (1  i), that it has not entered the
consideration set because of its salience; on the other hand, it also increases the probability
that better alternatives are considered.
Dening
1  ii
(1  i) i  
we have
@pOR (ai)
@
> 0,  < 
The threshold  ranges in ( 1; 1] and attains its maximum setting i = 1. Therefore
@pOR(ai)
@
is single peaked or monotonic on (0; 1) and pOR (ai) attains a maximum, as a
function of  2 (0; 1), at  whenever  2 (0; 1). For pOR (ai) to peak at positive levels
of , it must be that i < 1
i
for otherwise   0. Quality and salience are substitutes to
maintain a given .
The set of alternatives can thus be partitioned into in three types (according to when
an increase in rationality is good news for the alternative), which we record as:
Proposition 2 pOR (ai) has at most one peak as a function of  2 (0; 1). It is always
increasing for i = 1. For any i > 1, pOR (ai) is strictly increasing on an initial range i¤
ii < 1, and for  su¢ ciently high, pOR (ai) is strictly decreasing.
To summarise in words, for certain parameter values, the degree of rationality which
maximises the probability that a given alternative (di¤erent from the top one but of
su¢ cient good quality) is chosen, is an intermediate one. An increase in rationality is
good news only for:
13
- the top alternative, always;
- alternatives displaying a combination of good quality and low salience, at su¢ ciently
low rationality levels.
An agent with higher rationality may be less attracted by a good alternative (but not
the best) if it has high salience.
Note that only own salience, and not the salience of the other alternatives, a¤ects the
value of  and thus the sign of the derivative. The e¤ect of own salience on  (namely i i2)
is negative for i > 1 and zero for i = 1. A lower quality (increase in i) reduces the threshold
. The quality e¤ect and the salience e¤ect, as well as examples of choice probabilities
peaking at intermediate degrees of rationality fo second (or worse) rate alternatives, are
visualised in gure 2. Here, with respect to a baseline case (black line, i = 2, i = 0:1)
quality is decreased (to i = 6) in the pOR (ai) represented by the gray solid line while
salience is increased (to i = 0:3) in the pOR (ai) represented by the grey dashed line.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
rationality
choice probability
Figure 2: Comparative statics in the OR model: increasing i shifts pOR (ai) upwards and
to the left; increasing i shifts pOR (ai) downwards and to the left.
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3.2 AND model
The response of the probability of choice in the AND model as rationality increases is
qualitatively di¤erent from that of the OR model, as we now demonstrate.
In order to highlight the role of  it is instructive to rewrite the model with the
following notation. Let S (m; k) denote the ordered set of combinations of k elements
from the set f1; :::; mg, where jS (m; k)j =
 
m
k

, with all of the elements in S (m; k)
listed in ascending order lexicographically. Finally, let sm;k =

1; 2; :::;
 
m
k
	
denote the
corresponding index set and let S (m; k) (i) denote the i  th element of S (m; k).
To see why this notation is useful, let for example i = 4 and compute the probability
pAND (a4) that alternative a2 is selected. This is given by
pAND (a4) = 4 ((1  1) (1  2) (1  3))
= 4 (1  1  2  3+ 232 + 122 + 132   1233)
= 4 (1   (1 + 2 + 3) + 2 (12 + 13 + 23)  3123)
The relevant index sets are s3;1 = f1; 2; 3g, s3;2 = f1; 2; 3g and s3;3 = f1g, so that
e.g. S (3; 2) (1) = 12, S (3; 2) (2) = 13, S (3; 2) (3) = 13, and so on. Then we can
rewrite pAND (a4) as
pAND (a4) = 4
0@1 + 3X
j=1
0@( )j X
k2s3;j
S (3; j) (k)
1A1A
In general, dening
A (i; j) =
X
k2si 1;j
S (i  1; j) (k) ,
the probability that ai is chosen can be rewritten as:
pAND (ai) = i
 
1 +
i 1X
j=1

( )j A (i; j)
!
We can now check how this varies with rationality:
@pAND (ai)
@
= i
 
1 +
i 1X
j=1

( )j A (i; j)
!
+ i
 
i 1X
j=1
j ( 1)j  j 1A (i; j)!
which yields
@pAND (ai)
@
= i
 
1 +
i 1X
j=1

(j + 1) ( )j A (i; j)
!
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Like in the OR model, the e¤ect of a change in  on the probability of choice is
ambiguous, but here there clearly exists b 2 (0; 1) such that @pAND(ai)
@
> 0 if  < b. But
unlike in the OR model, there cannot be any sure-re loser from an increase in rationality:
every alternative gains from increases in rationality, whatever the salience prole and the
quality of the alternative, at su¢ ciently low levels of rationality (by taking away choice
probability from the default alternative a).
We now show that the threshold b, when it exists in (0; 1), is unique.
Proposition 3 For all i, pAND (ai) has at most one peak as a function of  2 (0; 1), and
it is strictly increasing on an initial range. Moreover pAND (ai) can be strictly increasing
on the entire interval (0; 1) even for i > 1.
All (easy but mostly tedious) missing proofs are relegated to a separate section.
The latter part of the statement highlights a major di¤erence from the OR model: in
the AND model increases in rationality can be good news for inferior alternatives at all
levels of rationality, something which cannot happen in the OR model.
Note nally that, unlike in the OR model, the entire salience prole is relevant to
determine the impact of rationality. We display the salience and quality e¤ect in the
graph below, using the same values as for the OR model:
3.3 Choice Odds and Menu E¤ects
We have noted that the e¤ect of an increase in rationality on the probability of choice of
any alternative which is not the best is ambiguous. But what about the odds of choosing
a better quality alternative over a lower quality alternative? Even if the probability of
choosing an inferior alternative increases with rationality, one may conjecture that it does
so at a lower speed than superior alternatives, so that the odds of making a better choice
increase. This conjecture is clearly true in the AND model. Dening, for i < j,
oddsAND (i; j)  pAND (ai)
pAND (aj)
=
i
j
Qj 1
k=i (1  k)
we have immediately
@oddsAND (i; j)
@
> 0
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Figure 3: Comparative statics in the AND model: increasing i shifts pOR (ai) upwards;
increasing i shifts pOR (ai) downwards. With these parameter values  is always increasing
over the (0; 1) interval.
But the conjecture is false in the OR model, at low levels of rationality and low levels
of salience of the inferior alternative, irrespective of the quality di¤erence between the
two alternatives.
Dene, with i < j,
oddsOR (i; j)  pOR (ai)
pOR (aj)
=
(i + (1  i) )
(j + (1  j) ) (1  )j i
Qj 1
k=i (1  k)
Then we have
Proposition 4 For all i; j with i < j, there exists  2 (0; 1) and j 2 (0; 1) such that,
for  <  and j < j,
@oddsOR(i;j)
@
< 0.
Observe that both expressions for the odds violate Luces [7] classical IIA axiom, which
states that the choice probability ratio for two alternatives ai and aj is independent of the
other alternatives in the choice set A. In our models14, this holds true only for changes
in A which remove or delete alternatives each of which is either better or worse than
both ai and aj. Inserting, for example, an alternative al with ai  al  aj in the choice
14Imagining now that they apply to a collection of subsets of a universal set of objects X.
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set would change the terms (1  )j iQj 1k=i (1  k) and Qj 1k=i (1  k) which appear
in oddsOR (i; j) and oddsAND (i; j), respectively. The insertion of such an intermediate
alternative would make no di¤erence regarding the probability of choice of the better al-
ternative ai, but would create a new event of probability (l + (1  l) ) (j + (1  j) )
in the OR model and (l) (j) in the AND model (namely the probabilities that an and
aj are both considered), in which the lower quality alternative is not chosen. As a par-
ticular implication of these observations, this means that oddsOR (i; j) and oddsAND (i; j)
are weakly increasing with the size of the choice set.
The dependence of the odds on the other available alternatives is often a realistic fea-
ture, which applied economist have sought to incorporate, for example, in the conditional
logit model.15 The blue bus-red bus problem is the standard example. Suppose the agent
chooses with probabilities one third each the train (t), a red bus (r) or a blue bus (b) as a
means of transport, so that the choice odds for any two alternatives are 1. Nevertheless,
if r is removed from the choice set, it is natural to expect that the odds of choosing b
over t become 2, rather than staying at 1 as required by IIA. In our model (once adapted
to include ranking ties), the natural exaplanation for why the odds should change (that
the agent ranks a blue bus and a red bus in the same way) immediately yields the odds
change.
4 Salience games
4.1 Absolute salience: The showiest is the best
We now imagine that alternatives can choose, possibly at a cost, the salience they pos-
sess. This is natural in several contexts. For example, a minor politician can make an
outrageous statement to get noticed by the media and enter the voters consideration
set, but he will likely incur a cost in terms of credibility. One can increase expenditure
on hairdressing to get noticed by potential partners. And rms, of course, have huge
advertising budgets.
15By adding a nested structure to choice process (nested logit) or by allowing heteroscedasticity of the
choice errors. See e.g. Greene [5].
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We are mainly interested in the question of how the equilibrium salience order cor-
relates with the quality order (and in how this is reected in choice probabilities). The
answer is not obvious a priori as incentives seem to run both ways. On the one hand the
best alternative has a strong incentive to get noticed: it fears no competition. On the
other hand, the only weapon the inferior alternatives have to have a chance to be chosen
is to increase their probability of entering the consideration set.
In this section we assume that there is a nite number of alternatives, and that the
strategy set for alternative ai is a nite subset S of the unit interval (below we illustrate
how other domains could be considered). The payo¤ to each alternative is the expected
probability of being chosen minus a (possibly negative) cost associated with the chosen
salience level. One interpretation of this function is that alternatives either vie for one
single chooser who chooses one alternative, or care about market sharewith a continuum
of identical choosers each of whom chooses one alternative. Formally, let e be a function
e : S ! Re. The payo¤ to alternative i for a pure strategy prole  2 Sn is
zi (i;  i) = (i + (1  i) ) (1  )i 1
Y
j<i
(1  j)  e (i)
for the OR model and
zi (i;  i) = i
Y
j<i
(1  j)  e (i)
for the AND model. We make no assumption on the function e. In particular, e can be
increasing or decreasing. So e could be intepreted as e¤ort, when increasing salience is
costly, or as elation, when increasing salience is pleasurable.
Proposition 5 In both the AND and the OR model there exists an equilibrium in pure
strategies.
The proof makes clear that this pure strategy existence result continues to hold when
S is a compact subset of [0; 1] and e (:) is continuous, or possibly discontinuous but
increasing. The next characterisation result holds even more generally, for any structure
of S  [0; 1] and any e (:).
When salience can be chosen endogenously, in equilibrium at any level of rationality
the salience order coincides with the preference order.
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Proposition 6 (The showiest is the best) Suppose ai  aj and let (1; :::; n) be a pure
strategy equilibrium. Then, for all , i > j both in the AND and in the OR model.
Note that lower quality alternatives do not have any intrinsic disadvantage, in terms
of salience enhancing technology, with respect to higher quality alternatives. The reason
why they produce less salience in equilibrium does not derive from lower levels of resources
or lower unit costs of salience production (as might be the case in a signalling story): every
alternative can choose from exactly the same set at exactly the same cost or benet.
4.2 Relative salience: the ugly duckling can get picked most
often
So far we have assumed that each alternative can select its own salience independently
of the salience of the other alternative. In this sense salience was absolute. This is
appropriate in some contexts, e.g. if repeated ads in favour of an alternative merely have
the function of making the agent aware of the alternative (did you know that people who
read book A also read book B?; have you considered using a scooter to go to work?),
with i representing either the probability that the agent is aware or the proportion
of aware agents within a population. In other contexts, however, alternatives can only
control variables that a¤ect salience in a relative way. If everybody else dresses in green
you will be salient by dressing in yellow, and viceversa. If all other candidates converge
on a given political message, you will be salient by deviating from that message. We call
this the case of relative salience.
We show that in this case the neat equilibrium ordering obtained in proposition 6
breaks down. As a consequence, it is even possible that, in equilibrium, the worst alter-
native is selected with the highest probability.
Suppose now that each alternative ai selects a position vi 2 [0; 1], and that own
salience is determined by the entire prole of the vis. In particular, we assume that an
alternatives salience is conferred by its di¤erence, in terms of position, from the average
alternative(excluding itself)
i =

vi  
P
j 6=i vj
(n  1)
2
2 [0; 1]
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The alternatives aim as usual at maximising the probability of being chosen, where the
probability is computed according to either the AND or te OR model.
Proposition 7 The AND model admits (for some n) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in which, for any , the worst alternative has the highest probability of being chosen.
Proposition 8 The OR model admits (for some n) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in
which, for  su¢ ciently small, the worst alternative has the highest probability of being
chosen. For  su¢ ciently high (for any n) the best alternative is chosen with the highest
probability.
The di¤erence between these two results stems from the di¤erence between the AND
the OR model we highlighted before: at degrees of rationality near one, the OR model -
but not the AND model - approximates well the standard utility maximisation model.
5 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3: Dene as in the text
A (i; j) =
X
k2si 1;j
S (i  1; j) (k)
We have already observed that pAND (ai) is strictly increasing on the initial range of
denition. We study the sign of @pAND(ai)
@
, which depends on the sign of the expression
1 +
i 1X
j=1

(j + 1) ( )j A (i; j)

(*)
= 2
 
1
2
+
i 1X
j=1

(j + 1) ( )j 2A (i; j)
!
We show that there exists a single value b 2 (0; 1) at which @pAND(a4)
@
vanishes. Suppose
to the contrary that there were two such values b 2 (0; 1) and bb 2 (0; 1), say with b < bb.
Then, using the LHS side expression in equation * and the denition of b and bb,
i 1X
j=1

(j + 1) ( b)j A (i; j) =  1 = i 1X
j=1

(j + 1)

 bbj A (i; j)
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On the other hand, using the RHS in equation * and the denition of b and bb,
i 1X
j=1

(j + 1) ( b)j 2A (i; j) =   1
(b)2
and
i 1X
j=1

(j + 1)

 bbj 2A (i; j) =   1bb2
Therefore
i 1X
j=1

(j + 1) ( b)j 2A (i; j) < i 1X
j=1

(j + 1)

 bbj 2A (i; j)
so that
(b)2 i 1X
j=1

(j + 1) ( b)j 2A (i; j) < bb2 i 1X
j=1

(j + 1)

 bbj 2A (i; j)
,
i 1X
j=1

(j + 1) ( b)j A (i; j) < i 1X
j=1

(j + 1)

 bbj A (i; j)
a contradiction. Therefore there is at most one value of  2 (0; 1) at which @pAND(ai)
@
vanishes, from which (since @pAND(ai)
@
is a polynomial and is strictly increasing on the
initial range of denition) the rst part of the statement follows. The plot in the text
shows examples for which pAND (ai) is strictly increasing on the whole interval (0; 1):
as is evident from the formula for pAND (ai), this can be obtained by setting values of
1; :::; i 1 su¢ ciently low (note that A (i; j) approximates i when 1; :::; i 1 are close
to zero).
Proof of Proposition 4: Di¤erentiate logarithmically and rearrange to obtain
@ log oddsOR (i; j)
@
=
(1  i)
(i + (1  i) ) +
(j   i)
(1  )  
(1  j)
(j + (1  j) )
which is negative for  and j small enough. Conclude by noting that oddsOR (i; j) is
a positive function so that sign@ log oddsOR(i;j)
@
= sign@oddsOR(i;j)
@
.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the OR model. At a pure strategy equilibrium,
alternative a1 simply solves the one-person problem
max
12S1
(i + (1  i) )  e (i)
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Let 1 be the solution to this problem. Now suppose inductively that for each i < j
the game restricted to alternatives a1; :::aj 1 has a pure strategy equilbrium
 
1; :::; 

j 1

.
Then the game between alternatives a1; :::aj (of which 1; :::; j   1 are indi¤erent to the
choice of alternative j) has the pure strategy equilbrium
 
1; :::; 

j

, where j is a solution
to the problem
max
j2Sj
(j + (1  j) ) (1  )j 1
Y
i<j
(1  i )  e (j)
So for any n the game has a pure strategy equilbrium.
A similar logic applies to the AND model.
Proof of Proposition 6: Consider the OR model. By contradiction, suppose that
ai  aj but i < j. We use a revealed preference argument. Because i is optimal for
alternative ai, it must provide a weakly higher expected payo¤ than j, that is:
(i + (1  i) ) (1  )i 1
Y
k<i
(1  k)  e (i)
 (j + (1  j) ) (1  )i 1
Y
k<i
(1  k)  e (j)
or
((i + (1  i) )  (j + (1  j) )) (1  )i 1
Y
k<i
(1  k)
 e (i)  e (j)
Since i < j and  < 1, we have (i + (1  i) )  (j + (1  j) ) < 0. Furthermore,
since ai  aj and thus i < j, we have that (1  )i 1
Q
k<i (1  k) > (1  )j 1
Q
k<j (1  k).
Therefore the previous displayed equation implies
((i + (1  i) )  (j + (1  j) )) (1  )j 1
Y
k<j
(1  k) > e (i)  e (j)
But then
(i + (1  i) ) (1  )j 1
Y
k<j
(1  k)  e (i)
> (j + (1  j) ) (1  )j 1
Y
k<j
(1  k)  e (j)
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which means that alternative j would gain by deviating from j to i, a contradiction.
The same argument works for the AND model. If ai  aj it must be
(i)
Y
k<i
(1  k)  e (i)  (j)
Y
k<i
(1  k)  e (j)
or
(i   j) 
Y
k<i
(1  k)  e (i)  e (j)
Therefore if it were i < j we would have
(i   j) 
Y
k<j
(1  k) > e (i)  e (j)
which contradicts the optimality of j for aj.
Proof of Proposition 7: We consider the case of three alternatives and claim that the
position prole v = (0; 0; 1) is a Nash Equilibrium. For a generic prole v, the choice
probabilities are given by
pAND (a1; v) =
 
v1   v2+v32
2

pAND (a2; v) =
 
v2   v1+v32
2


1   v1   v2+v32 2 
pAND (a3; v) =
 
v3   v1+v22
2


1   v1   v2+v32 2 1   v2   v1+v32 2 
It is seen immediately that alternative 1s best replies to v2 = 0 and v3 = 1 are v1 = 1
and v1 = 0, so that it cannot protably deviate from v. Turning now to alternative 2,
check
@pAND (a2; v)
@v2

v1=0
v3=1
=
1
8
 (2v2   1)
 
8    5v2   4v22

Studying the sign, it is straightforward to verify that the possible maxima are at v2 = 0
and, depending on the size of , either v2 = 12 or v2 = 1. The corresponding choice
probabilities are:
pAND (a2; v
) =
1
4


1  1
4


pAND

a2;

0;
1
2
; 1

= 0
pAND (a2; (0; 1; 1)) =
1
4
 (1  )
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so that, regardless of the size of , alternative 2 cannot protably deviate from v.
Finally consider alternative 3:
@pAND (a3; v)
@v3

v1=0
v2=0
=
1
8
v3
 
v23   4
  
3v23   4

The roots of the polynomial are v3 = 0, v3 =  2p and v3 =  2p3 , so that for v3 2 [0; 1] we
have that @pAND(a3;v)
@v3

v1=0
v2=0
> 0 for v3 2

0; 2p
3

and v3 > 2p , while
@pAND(a3;v)
@v3

v1=0
v2=0
< 0 for
v3 2

2p
3
; 2p


. It follows that pAND (a3; (0; 0; v3)) is maximised for v3 = min
n
1; 2p
3
o
=
1. The corresponding choice probability is
pAND (a3; v
) =
1
16
 (  4)2
It is now straightforward to verify that
pAND (a3; v
) > pAND (a1; v) > pAND (a2; v)
Proof of Proposition 8: Consider again the case with three alternatives. The choice
probabilities are now:
pOR (a1; v) =

v1   v2 + v3
2
2
+
 
1 

v1   v2 + v3
2
2!

pOR (a2; v) =
=
 
v2   v1 + v3
2
2
+
 
1 

v2   v1 + v3
2
2!

! 
1 

v1   v2 + v3
2
2!
(1  )
pOR (a3; v) =
=
 
v3   v1 + v2
2
2
+
 
1 

v3   v1 + v2
2
2!!


 
1 

v1   v2 + v3
2
2! 
1 

v2   v1 + v3
2
2!
(1  )2
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Evaluating at v = (0; 0; 1) yields:
pOR (a1; v
) =
1
4
(1 + 3)
pOR (a2; v
) =
3
4
(1  ) 1
4
(1 + 3)
pOR (a3; v
) =
9
16
(1  )2
It is imediately apparent that pOR (a1; v) > pOR (a2; v). Moreover, for  2 (0; 1),
pOR (a3; v
) > pOR (a1; v) if and only if  < 5 2
p
5
3
< 1
3
; and pOR (a3; v) > pOR (a2; v) if
and only if  < 1
3
.
To verify that v is an equilibrium, it is immediately checked that alternative 1 cannot
protably deviate from v. Turning now to alternative 2;compute:
@pOR (a2; v)
@v2

v1=0
v3=1
=
1
8
(  1)   10 (1  ) v32   3 (1  ) v22 + 2 (7  11) v2   (3+ 5)
Assume now that  < 1
3
. This implies that pOR (a2; (0; v2; 1)) can only be maximised at
v2 = 0 or v2 = 1. The corresponding choice probabilities are
pAND (a2; (0; 0; 1)) =
3
16
(1 + 3) (1  )
pAND (a2; (0; 1; 1)) = 0
so that v2 = 0 is the best reply.
Turning nally to alternative 3:
@pOR (a3; v)
@v3

v1=0
v2=0
=
1
4
v3 (v3   2) (v3 + 2) (1  )2
and it is easy to check that pOR (a2; (0; 0; v3)) is maximised in v3 = 0.
The second part of the statement follows trivially from inspection of the payo¤ func-
tions.
6 Concluding remarks and related literature
The broad aim of this paper was to open the black box of bounded rationality and
statistical distributions in explaining choice errors that make an agent deviate from true
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utility maximisation. Admittedly, we have opened just one box. Other explanations,
beside consideration sets, may be relevant. Recently Rubinstein and Salant [21] have
studied an agent who expresses di¤erent preferences under di¤erent frames of choice.
The link with this paper is that the set of such preferences is interpreted as a set of
deviations from a true (welfare relevant) preference. However, their analysis takes a very
di¤erent direction from ours in that it eschews any stochastic element. The probability
model is, on the contrary, at the core of our theory.
There are also di¤erent plausible ways to model consideration sets and the compe-
tition for them. The already mentioned work by Eliaz and Spiegler [3] studies in great
detail the competition between two rms, who choose marketing strategies to make their
products enter the consideration sets of a continuum of identical consumers. The choice
model at the heart of this work is an application of Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [9],
which is deterministic. Eliaz and Spiegler [3] also perform comparative statics exercises
that relate to changes in rationality. One the main ndings is that in some equilibria
rms do not increase their prots compared to a situation in which consumers are fully
rational (informed). More comparisons are made either by introducing in the population
of boundedly rational consumers some rational consumers, or by changing the consider-
ation function(the function that determines the consideration set of consumers). One
implication is that industry prots are a non-monotonic function of changes in rationality
thus dened.
A rst general message from our paper is that revealed preferencesare not necessarily
a better guide to discovering true preferences when the rationality of the agent is higher
(namely when the agent has a higher probability of being better informed about the
available alternatives). For example, suppose you can observe or infer the degrees of
rationality,  and 0, under which two sets choices were made. Suppose that alternative
x is chosen more frequently over alternative y in condition  than in condition 0: it does
not necessarily follow from the fact that  > 0 that x is more likely to be better that
y. Less rational agents (or agents choosing under worse informational conditions) may
express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.
A second message is that the revealed preference ranking coincide (probabilistically)
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with the true preference relation in only two cases: if (1) salience is exogenous, or if (2)
salience is endogenous but can be fully set by the alternatives (a yellow dress is salient).
But the revealed preference ranking can even reverse the true ranking when salience is
endogenous and is relative (a yellow dress is salient when all other dresses are green).
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